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THE COURT OP APPEALS, 1934 TERM
trates their reluctance to depart from the traditional prohibition against hearsay
evidence.20
Medical Opinion Evidence
A general rule of negligence law applicable to Workmen's Compensation
proceedings is that where death from one cause is accelerated, however slightly, by
another compensable cause, the death is compensable.21 In Riehl v. Town of Am-
herst-Department of Highways,22 decedent died of cancer, and his estate claims
death benefits because the death certificate stated heart disease, a compensable
injury for which benefits were being paid, was a contributing factor in the death.
The court reversing the Appellate Division,2 3 held, that the award was not sup-
ported by substantial evidence, because the attending physician during his testimony
stated he could not prove any causal connection between cancer and heart disease.24
A death certificate can have no greater probative force than the grounds
upon which the testimony of the certifying doctor shows it to be based.25 The
majority applies this rule to the instant case and concludes that since the doctor
admits he cannot prove a causal connection between cancer and heart disease, the
evidence is speculative and not substantial.26 The dissent disagrees as to the
implication arising from the doctor's testimony and contends that there is substan-
tial evidence to support an award.
The decision appears to be correct on the evidentiary point decided,27 but it is
suggested that on the substantive point of whether a causal connection may be
found between cancer and heart disease, more adequate evidence could sustain an
award.28
20. 2 LARSEN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAV, §79.30.
21. 2 Restatement of Torts 431, 432; McCahill v. New York Transportation
Company, 201 N. Y. 221, 94 N. E. 616 (1911).
22. 308 N. Y. 212, 124 N. E. 2d 287 (1954).
23. 283 App. Div. 196, 126 N. Y. S. 2d 594 (3rd Dep't 1953).
24. Conway and Dye, JJ. dissent and vote to affirm on the opinion of Halpern,
J. In the Appellate Division.
25. McCormackc v. National City Bank of New York, 303 N. Y. 5, 99 N. E. 2d
887 (1951).
26. See Bye v. State Ins. Fund, 279 App. Div. 1105, 112 N. Y. S. 2d 114 (3rd
Dep't 1952), where medical testimony was held to be speculative that an industrial
accident aggravated a preexisting cancerous condition, but cf. Murphy's Case,
infra, Note 28.
27. McCormack v. National City Bank of New York, supra, Note 25.
28. Murphy's Case, 328 Mass. 301, 103 N. E. 2d 267 (1952), where heart disease
was found to be a contributing cause of death by cancer.
